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This paper reviews the literature on the effects of low steady-state inflation on wage 
formation, focusing on four different effects. First, under low inflation, downward nominal 
wage rigidity (DNWR) may prevent real wage cuts that would have happened had inflation 
been higher. Second, wages (and prices) are given in nominal contracts, and inflation affects 
both how often wages are adjusted, and to what extent wages are set in a forward-looking 
manner. Third, incomplete labour contracts may provide workers with scope for inflicting 
costs on the firm without violating the contract, thus forcing the firm to accept a rise in 
nominal wages. Fourth, if effort depends on wages relative to a reference level, and workers 
and firms underweight inflation when updating the reference level, positive but moderate 
inflation may reduce wage pressure. The paper ends by a brief survey of empirical evidence, 
and a discussion of whether labour markets may adapt to a low inflation environment. 
JEL Code: J5, J3, E31. 
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Economists and practitioners now agree that monetary policy should aim at low 
inflation. Yet a number of economists and observers have argued that if monetary 
policy aims at inflation that is too low, this may involve considerable costs for so-
ciety (Tobin, 1972, Holden, 1994, Akerlof, Dickens and Perry, 1996, 2000, the 
Economist, 2003). A key concern is that under low or zero inflation, downward ri-
gidity of nominal wages may induce higher wage pressure, involving higher equi-
librium unemployment. Other economists have countered this view, arguing that 
any downward nominal wage rigidity that may exist is the result of an inflationary 
environment, and that society will adapt to a zero inflation policy without large 
and persistent effects on output and unemployment (Ball and Mankiw, 1994, 
Gordon, 1996). 
In this paper I shall review what the economic literature has to say on the ef-
fects of low steady-state inflation on wage formation.1 Crudely, one can distin-
guish four arguments for why inflation may affect wage setting. First, under low 
inflation, downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) may prevent real wage cuts 
that would have happened had inflation been higher. Second, wages (and prices) 
are given in nominal contracts, and inflation affects both how often wages are ad-
justed, and to what extent wages are set in a forward-looking manner. Third, in-
complete labour contracts may provide workers with scope for inflicting costs on 
the firm without violating the contract, thus forcing the firm to accept a rise in 
nominal wages. Unless there is sufficient inflation to provide “room” for this 
“minimum” wage growth, wage pressure will rise, thus increasing unemployment. 
Fourth, if effort depends on wages relative to a reference level, and workers and 
firms underweight inflation when updating the reference level, positive but mod-
erate inflation may reduce wage pressure.  
Among many economists, these mechanisms will be met with considerable 
scepticism, based on the argument that rational agents care only about real vari-
ables, so that any effect of nominal variables must be due to money illusion that 
will disappear over time. However, as will become apparent below, many of the 
mechanisms are developed in models with rational agents, who only care about 
real variables. Thus, they are not subject to this critique. Other effects do hinge on 
money illusion, but these effects are accompanied by considerable supporting evi-
dence. 
A basic underlying assumption throughout the literature that I review is that 
there is some sort of nominal rigidity in wages. This assumption can be justified in 
various ways. First, it is a fact of life that, in most industrialised economies, most 
workers have their wage set in some type of contract, either a collective agreement 
or an individual labour contract. Payment is typically specified in nominal terms, 
although annual, partial indexation to the consumer price index is sometimes used, 
in particular in periods of high inflation. Such contracts are not adjusted continu-
ously; see survey in Taylor (1999), and Calmfors et al. (2001) for documenting the 
extensive coverage of collective agreements in most Western European countries.  
                                                             
1   Clearly, an unanticipated reduction in inflation induces higher real wages, and thus also 




There may be several reasons for the prevalence of rigid wage contracts. One 
aspect is that contracts may prove useful so as to prevent continuous haggling over 
the wage level. Contracts might also be useful to share risk or to protect against 
opportunistic behaviour. Nominal contracts might be practical, as continuous or 
frequent adjustment to some price index might involve additional cumbersome 
calculations and updating. Indexation may also entail a risk (as perceived of the 
wage setters) that the index exhibits surprising and unwarranted changes. Gottfries 
(1992) provides a possible justification for why wage contracts are set in nominal 
terms, as seen from the point of view of the firm and the insiders (the current 
workforce).  
Note that what matters for the issues discussed here is not the rate of inflation 
per se, but to what extent there is room for nominal wage growth. Clearly, if there 
is high productivity growth, or low growth in import prices, there will be more 
room for nominal wage growth even at low cpi inflation. This distinction is impor-
tant in empirical work and in policy discussion, but will be neglected in the fol-
lowing. 
The paper does not aim to explore what the optimal rate of inflation is. As is 
well known, inflation involves a number of costs and benefits that are not directly 
related to wage setting (interaction with tax systems, effects on money holdings, 
seignorage, uncertainty and the effects of zero bound to nominal interest rates, 
etc.). These costs and benefits are neglected in the present paper. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, I discuss the 
effects of downward nominal wage rigidity. The effect of inflation on staggered 
nominal wage contracts is surveyed in section 3. Section 4 covers the effect of in-
complete labour contracts and section 5 deals with multi-level bargaining. In sec-
tion 6, I discuss near-rational wage setters. Some of the empirical evidence is sur-
veyed in section 7. Section 8 discusses to what extent society might adapt to a low 
inflation environment. Section 9 concludes. 
2  The effect of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) 
The seminal contribution on DNWR is Tobin (1972). Tobin argued that low (zero) 
inflation involves higher unemployment because nominal wages are rigid down-
wards. Sector-specific demand shocks imply that demand varies between different 
parts of the economy. In the parts of economy where there is excess demand, 
wages increase, while in parts of the economy with excess supply, DNWR implies 
that wages do not go down (or they go down less). Thus, widespread excess sup-
ply – lower aggregate employment – is necessary to keep inflation very low. 
Several different justifications for DNWR have been suggested in the literature 
•  co-ordination failure and the concern for relative wages. 
•  fairness; nominal wage cuts are viewed as unfair 
•  legal restrictions: wages are given in contracts that can only be changed by 






Co-ordination failure was a key argument of Keynes (1936). He argued that 
workers are concerned about relative wages, and thus oppose nominal wage cuts 
as this leads to lower relative wages. Workers are less opposed to the same reduc-
tion in real wages if it takes place via higher prices, as this does not affect relative 
wages. Bhaskar (1990) provides additional microfoundations for this idea, based 
on the assumption that workers’ disutility of being paid less than others is greater 
than the utility gain of being paid more. 
The fairness argument – that employers avoid cutting nominal wages because 
employees and employers think that nominal wage cuts are unfair – is the com-
mon hypothesis underlying much empirical work. Many economists are sceptical 
towards this idea, as it involves money illusion, and thus runs counter to the stan-
dard rationality arguments. However, there is now considerable survey evidence 
by Bewley (1999) and Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997), among others, docu-
menting that money illusion does exist. Fehr and Tyran (2001) report experimental 
evidence that money illusion may have important effects. Akerlof, Dickens and 
Perry (1996) explore the consequences of DNWR within a simulation model, for-
malising the ideas of Tobin (1972).  
As to the legal restrictions argument, MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) point 
out that under European legal rules, wage contracts for individual workers can 
only be changed by mutual consent. (This is in contrast to US law, where workers 
are assumed to consent to a wage cut if they show up at work, see Malcomson, 
1997.) Holden (1994) makes the same observation for collective agreements.2 
MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and Holden (1999) show that this feature - fixed 
nominal wage contracts that can only be changed by mutual consent - may be cru-
cial to prevent hold-up inefficiency, and thus induce efficient levels of investment. 
Larsen (undated) shows how fixed wage contracts are consistent with an effi-
ciently operating economy in a dynamic general equilibrium model. 
Akerlof et al. (1996) and Holden (1994, 2004) use the same macroeconomic 
framework to analyse the implications of DNWR (see Andersen, 2001, for a text-
book-like version of Akerlof et al.’s model, and Palley, 1994, for a related argu-
ment). Let me therefore use some space to describe this. Consider a standard mo-
nopolistic competition economy, with a large number of symmetric firms, each 
producing a different good. Production takes place under constant returns to scale, 
with labour as the only input. Firms face downward-sloping demand curves (with 
uniform elasticity), and set prices so as to maximise profits. As is well known, this 
implies that prices are set as a constant mark-up over wages, implying that the real 
wage is a constant, independent of the aggregate employment rate.  (See the hori-
zontal price curve in figure 1.) Wages are set at firm level, in a bargain between 
workers and firms. The outcome of the bargaining is affected by the aggregate 
employment rate, as a higher employment rate improves the bargaining position of 
                                                             
2 The legal position of collective agreements varies between countries, and between various 
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Figure 1. The standard model. Equilibrium employment is given by the inter- 
section of the wage and price curves. 
the workers. Thus the wage curve, representing the outcome of the wage setting, is 
upward-sloping in the employment – real-wage space, see figure 1. 
Without any nominal wage rigidity, figure 1 illustrates the standard result that 
the equilibrium rate of employment (and also the equilibrium rate of unemploy-
ment) is given by the intersection of the wage and price curve, and thus is inde-
pendent of the rate of inflation. The model is then essentially that of Layard, Nick-
ell and Jackman (1991) (see page 19), or Blanchard (2003, page 132), where the 
same figure is depicted. In this model, any change that weakens the bargaining po-
sition of the workers (e.g. a reduction of unemployment benefits) moves the wage 
curve downwards, raising equilibrium employment. 
 
 
In Akerlof et al. (1996), a simulation model is explored where firm-specific 
shocks induce changes in what they refer to as the notional real wage, i.e. the real 
wage that would prevail without any nominal wage rigidity. If a negative shock 
takes place so that the notional real wage involves a nominal wage cut, Akerlof et 
al. assume that DNWR (due to fairness reasons) prevents the cut, implying that 





inflation, this will happen in a large part of the economy, so that wage pressure in-
creases, the wage curve moves up in figure 1, and the equilibrium rate of employ-
ment is reduced. 
In Holden (1994, 2004), DNWR is justified by the legal feature mentioned 
above. Consistent with institutional regularities in many countries, it is assumed 
that when collective agreements are up for renewal (usually annually), they will be 
prolonged in nominal terms unless both parties agree to a change. Holden shows 
that the party that must initiate the change has a strategic disadvantage in the bar-
gaining process. Under positive inflation, workers want a nominal wage rise, so 
that they have a strategic disadvantage. Thus, wage pressure is reduced, the wage 
































inflation, or under low inflation in firms experiencing a negative shock so that 
wages should be cut, it is the firm who wants to reduce wages, and thus have the 
strategic disadvantage. In this case, wage pressure is increased, the wage curve 
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Figure 2. Inflation weakens the bargaining position of the workers,  




moves up, and equilibrium employment is decreased (see figure 2). The upshot is 
a Phillips curve which is vertical for high inflation and negative inflation, but high 
inflation involves lower unemployment than negative inflation, cf. figure 3. (The 
smoothing reflects firm-specific shocks.) 
Why is the party who wants to initiate the change at a strategic disadvantage? 
Holden analyses this in a non-cooperative bargaining model of the Rubinstein 
(1982) type. Both parties may disrupt production (strike or lock-out) as a means of 
enforcing a renegotiation of the wage contract. If a strike or lockout takes place, 
the outcome will be a real wage which depends on the bargaining position of the 
parties, including the effect of the aggregate employment rate. However, initiating 
a strike or lockout also involves costs to both parties, in the form of lost output 
during the work stoppage, and possibly also due to adverse effects on reputation, 
increased uncertainty etc 
To fix ideas, consider the following simple numerical illustration. (See Holden, 
1994, 2004, for a rigorous treatment.) Assume for simplicity a stationary eco-
nomic environment, where wage negotiations undertaken during a work stoppage 
(strike or lock-out) lead to a real wage of 100. Consider first an inflation scenario, 
where inflation has eroded the real value of the nominal wage specified in the con-
tract. Thus, we assume that the real value of the existing contract wage is 90. Now 
the contract is up for possible renegotiation. If a strike takes place, there will be an 
agreement on a new wage of 100. Furthermore, a strike (or lock-out) will involve 
costs corresponding to a per time unit loss of 5 over the contract period, for both 
workers and firms. Thus, if the workers initiate a strike, they will obtain a payoff 
of 100 – 5 = 95. Clearly, strike threats are credible, as this will give the workers a 
higher payoff than they will obtain from prolonging the existing contract. How-
ever, if the firm offers a new contract of 95 + ε, where ε is a small positive num-
ber, strike threats will no longer be credible. Workers will obtain a higher payoff 
from accepting the firm’s offer of 95 + ε than from initiating a strike. Thus, the 
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Figure 3. The long run Phillip curve. Zero or negative inflation involves 





Then consider a negative inflation scenario, where the real value of the existing 
nominal contract wage has increased to, say, 110. In this case, it is the firm who 
wants to reduce wages. A lockout is credible, as it provides the firm with a payoff 
corresponding to a wage of 105 (wage 100 + costs 5 = 105), which is better than 
the existing wage of 110. But if the workers offer a wage of 105 – ε, a lockout is 
no longer credible, as it yields a lower payoff to the firm than the workers’ new 
wage offer. Thus, the firm will accept the offer of 105 – ε, and no lockout will 
take place. 
The example above shows that even if the real situation is the same in the two 
scenarios – absent an initial wage, the new contract should give a real wage of 100 
–  the existence of the initial nominal contract wage affects the bargaining out-
come. High inflation erodes the real value of the nominal wage given in the con-
tract, putting workers at a strategic disadvantage. Negative inflation, or low infla-
tion and a firm-specific negative shock, puts firms at a strategic disadvantage. 
Consider the effect of indexation in this example. Under low but positive infla-
tion, partial indexation to the general price level will raise the nominal wage that 
is specified in the contract. Thus, it will raise the nominal wage at which DNWR 
prevails, implying that DNWR may be binding when relative wages change under 
higher rates of inflation than what would be the case if there were no indexation. 
On the other hand, under negative inflation, symmetric, partial, indexation that en-
tails a reduction in nominal wages will work in the opposite way, reducing the 
nominal wage specified in the contract. However, under negative inflation, 
DNWR seems likely to be binding in parts of the labour market anyway. 
Holden (2004) extends the analysis in the 1994 paper by also allowing for an 
unorganised sector. Here, DNWR hinges on the strength of the employment pro-
tection legislation, which provides workers with a means of refusing a wage cut 
proposed by the employer. Thus, this analysis suggests that DNWR is prevalent in 
countries with a high coverage of collective agreements/high union density (as un-
ions have a stronger position to refuse nominal wage cuts than individual workers 
have) and in countries with strong employment protection legislation.  
 
Some counter-arguments 
The macroeconomic effects of DNWR implied by the models above are not un-
disputed cf. Hogan (1997) and Yates (1998). Most importantly, Hogan (1997) ar-
gues that if wage setting is forward-looking, firms will take the possible future ef-
fect of DNWR into consideration. Elsby (2004) takes the argument further within 
a fully specified forward-looking model of wage setting under DNWR arising 
from fairness considerations. Elsby argues that the risk of future DNWR may lead 
to attenuation of wage increases, i.e. that firms raise wages less than they would 
have done if wages were fully flexible. The attenuation of wage increases will be 
stronger under low inflation. The idea here is that, under high inflation, firms fac-




know that the high real wage can be reversed in the future by just letting nominal 
wages be constant. Under low inflation and DNWR, firms facing a positive shock 
will be more reluctant to raise wages a lot, as raising wages increase the risk that 
DNWR will push up wages in the future. (Bewley, in his discussion of Akerlof et 
al., 2000, reports conversations with managers who express exactly this concern.) 
Elsby then shows that previous studies, by neglecting this effect, have overstated 
the costs of DNWR. 
Note, however, that this argument is not fatal for the effect of inflation on the 
workers’ bargaining position. The feature that rational agents take into considera-
tion the possibility that DNWR may affect wages in the future, will diminish the 
negative effect of inflation on the union’s bargaining position, but it will not re-
move it (Holden, 1997).  
A second counter-argument by Hogan (1997) against the effect of DNWR on 
employment is that higher real wages need not lead to lower employment if firms 
hoard labour, or if higher real wages make an unemployed person more likely to 
accept a job. It is, however, not clear that this point is valid. If wage pressure is in-
creased, wage and price setting are not consistent, and something has to change so 
as to make wage and price setting consistent. If firms hoard labour, so that unem-
ployment does not increase, the real wage implied by the wage setting would re-
main higher than the real wage implied by the price setting. Thus, it seems that 
excessive wage pressure would prevail until firms started to shed labour, raising 
unemployment. 
A more general argument against the idea that nominal wages affect output is 
based on evidence that real wages seem to be acyclical or slightly pro-cyclical. The 
argument runs as follows: If nominal wages are rigid, and the labour demand curve 
is downward sloping, demand shocks will involve movement along the labour de-
mand curve and thus involve counter-cyclical real wages. But evidence suggests that 
real wages are acyclical or slightly pro-cyclical. This has been raised as a key objec-
tion to macroeconomic models with nominal wage rigidity. However, as Spencer 
(1998) pointed out, if there are both demand shocks and technology shocks, the lat-
ter will induce procyclical behaviour of real wages. The overall cyclicality of real 
wages will depend on both types of shocks. Spencer shows that US postwar data in-
dicates that a positive demand disturbance is associated with a temporary decline in 
real wages, consistent with a model with nominal wage rigidity. 
An interesting approach to the effect of inflation on wage setting is the Grease 
and Sand argument of Groshen and Schweitzer (2000). They note the well-known 
effect that, under downward nominal wage rigidity, inflation may facilitate 
changes in wage distribution across occupations (Grease). On the other hand, they 
also argue that inflation involves greater expectational errors that may cause unin-
tended changes in the wage distribution across firms (Sand). These effects are ana-
lysed in a unified framework, making it possible to evaluate benefits and costs of 





3  The effect of inflation on staggered nominal wage contracts 
In the literature on staggered wage and price setting, it is usually implicitly or ex-
plicitly assumed that one can abstract from trend inflation without any problems.  
However, as shown by Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988), this is not so. Under high 
inflation, wage adjustment will be more frequent, and this will cause the short-run 
Phillips curve to be steeper, reducing the persistence of shocks. In related models, 
Helpman and Leiderman (1990) and Kolsrud and Nymoen (1998) argue that infla-
tion reconciles the conflicting claims of workers and firms, and thus may affect 
the equilibrium output. More recently, Ascari (2000) has shown that inflation in-
creases the forward-lookingness of wage setters, again reducing the persistence of 
shocks to the economy.  
Allowing for steady-state inflation in standard staggered-contracts models has 
several and opposing effects on long-run output and employment. Ascari (2003) 
shows that under time-contingent price setting, trend inflation implies that other-
wise symmetric firms will set different prices in steady state. Due to the usual 
non-linearities in the utility and production functions, this leads to an aggregate 
output loss. Ascari concludes that “a very mild level of trend inflation implies 
huge and unrealistic changes in the steady-state output level.” In contrast, Kara-
nassou, Sala and Snower (2003a,b) argue that the reduction in inflation over the 
last decades plays an important role in explaining increased unemployment. Kara-
nassou et al. refer to their idea as “frictional growth”, and the key point is as fol-
lows. Under staggered, time-contingent nominal contracts, nominal variables are a 
weighted average of their past and expected future variables. Owing to time dis-
counting, wage setters will put less weight on the last part of the contract period, 
implying that inflation causes wages and prices to lag behind money growth. Con-
sequently, the higher the rate of inflation, the more wages and prices lag behind 
money, thus increasing the real money stock, which again increases output and 
employment. Furthermore, Karanassou et al. argue that the weighting is amplified 
owing to uncertainty and multiple nominal rigidities, i.e. both rigid wages and 
rigid prices.  
4  Incomplete labour contracts and nominal wage growth 
Almost all the literature on DNWR deals with the idea that nominal wages are 
constant in situations where flexible wages would fall. However, there is a small 
body of literature that argues that there are mechanisms inducing a certain nominal 
wage growth, implying that unless inflation is sufficiently high to allow for this 
nominal wage growth, other mechanisms (read unemployment) must be at work to 
prevent the nominal wage growth.  
A key possible cause of nominal wage growth is incomplete labour contracts. 
As argued by Moene (1988), workers can impose costs on a firm even when work-




(work-to-rule). Such behaviour is well known from real-world wage negotiations 
in many industrialised economies. On the other hand, the firm may reduce flexible 
types of remuneration as bonus payments etc. Yet if workers can impose larger 
costs on the firms than vice versa, which appears to be a plausible assumption in 
most cases, nominal wages increase during work-to-rule (Holden, 1997). Intui-
tively, firms are willing to raise the nominal wages so as to avoid a costly period 
of work-to-rule; see Holden (1989) for supporting empirical evidence. Nickell and 
Quintini (2003) find evidence for the UK that there are employees “who would 
have had negative nominal wage changes without the distortion who, in fact, have 
significantly positive, rather than zero, nominal wage changes”, i.e. as predicted 
by the idea that work-to-rule may induce nominal wage growth, inducing higher 
real wages, even in a situation where real wages would have gone down had infla-
tion been higher. 
5  Multi-level bargaining and the co-ordination of wage setting 
Most of the literature on DNWR presumes that wage setting is unco-ordinated. Al-
lowing for centralised or co-ordinated wage setting implies additional effects. 
Most importantly, several Nordic researchers have argued that multi-level wage 
setting systems, as in the Nordic countries, where wages are negotiated both cen-
trally (at national and/or industry level) and locally, may cause a minimum rate of 
growth in nominal wages. In the literature, two versions of this feature have been 
discussed.  
Rødseth (1985), Holden (1988), Rødseth and Holden (1990), and Calmfors 
(1993) argue that wage setters at the central level both generally want wage re-
straint, and, to a large extent, are able to predict wage growth at the local level. 
However, some wage growth at the local level is unavoidable, in part due to the 
possibility of work-to-rule under the peace clause that prevails at the local negotia-
tions, given that the central agreements are in force. Under low inflation, wage re-
straint may require a nominal wage cut at the central level, and in this situation 
DNWR at the central level may induce higher real wages and lower employment. 
Holden (1998) provides empirical evidence for the existence of a floor to nominal 
wage growth of 2 – 3 percent at the central level in the manufacturing sectors of 
the four major Nordic countries for the period 1961 – 1985/92.  
The other version of the inflationary bias of multi-level wage setting, advocated 
by, among others, Hibbs and Locking (1996) and Iversen (1999), emphasises that 
central wage setting has historically involved compression of relative wages. This 
causes a need for wage growth at the local level to restore relative wages, wholly 
or partially, to their market values. Under low inflation, the combination of wage 
growth at both levels will induce excessive real wage growth and lower unem-
ployment. 
Note that one can also argue for the opposite conclusion, that wage setting sys-





changes in the rate of inflation.3 The idea here is that the centralised wage settle-
ments often end up in a general increase which is a little below the sum of infla-
tion and average productivity growth. Thus, if inflation is reduced, a coordinated, 
multi-level system may, in principle, easily adapt by reducing the general increase, 
without being bothered by coordination problems that may exist in less centralised 
wage-setting systems. One may argue that countries with extensive incomes poli-
cies and social pacts, like the Netherlands and Norway, have adapted better to the 




6  Near-rational wage and price setters  
For decades, most economists have frowned upon explanations based on non-
rational agents. While such behaviour is often viewed as plausible, many econo-
mists have argued that it is ad hoc. Furthermore, one has wanted to avoid a situa-
tion where different researchers invoke different behavioural assumptions as key 
foundations in their own theories. However, research by cognitive psychologists 
and experimental economists has provided strong support for behavioural assump-
tions that differ systematically from the standard economic main assumption (see 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, and the surveys in Rabin, 1998, and Fehr and 
Schmidt, 2002). 
Building on this research, Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000) argue that wage 
and price setters treat inflation differently from what most economists assume. 
First, when inflation is low, many people ignore it. Second, workers view nominal 
wage increases as a sign that they are appreciated, without reflecting about nomi-
nal wage increases as being an element of a general rise in wage and price levels. 
More specifically, Akerlof et al. consider a model where workers’ effort de-
pends on their wage relative to a reference level. Near-rational firms do not take 
low inflation into account when updating their reference level; thus, wages are in-
creased by less than they should. Correspondingly, rational firms who know that 
their workers are near-rational will also underweight inflation when updating the 
reference level. Thus, wage pressure is reduced, and equilibrium employment in-
creased, for positive but moderate inflation. 
When inflation is high, however, underweighting of inflation will involve much 
larger costs. Thus, near-rational wage and price setters will take inflation fully into 
account when it is high. Hence, the reduction in wage pressure induced by low in-
flation only prevails for moderate, positive levels of inflation, and not for high 
rates of inflation. 
                                                             




7 Empirical evidence  
The last few years, a rapidly increasing literature has emerged testing for the exis-
tence and implications of DNWR. Due to the size and speed of increase of this lit-
erature,  only a brief selective survey will be provided. Different types of evidence 
have been put forward. Akerlof et al (1996), Bewley (1999), Agell and Lundborg 
(2003) and Agell and Bennmarker (2003) report results from interviews and sur-
veys where employers and employees are asked about (among other thing) 
DNWR. These studies report that nominal wage cuts are rare in the US and Swe-
den.  
Other studies investigate DNWR in large micro-data sets based on wage sur-
veys, administrative files, personnel files, or data for union contracts. While these 
studies generally find nominal wage cuts to be more frequent than one finds in in-
terviews, the studies with few exceptions nevertheless find evidence that DNWR 
exists. Typically, the studies find (i) a spike in the distribution of nominal wage 
changes at zero and (ii) that the rate of inflation affects the distribution of nominal 
wage changes, both features as would be implied by the existence of DNWR. The 
studies include Fehr and Goette (2000) for Switzerland, Beissinger and Knoppik 
(2000) and Knoppik and Beissinger (2001) for Germany, Christofides and Leung 
(2003) for Canada, Ekberg (2002) for Sweden, Devicienti (2004) for Italy, Kimura 
and Ueda (1997) for Japan, Nickell and Quintini (2003) for the UK, and Altonji 
and Devereux (1999) and Lebow et al. (2003) for the US. (The latter three papers 
also discuss previous empirical findings for the UK and the US.)  
The study by Lebow et al is noteworthy because it also includes data on total 
compensation. Lebow et al find that even if total compensation is somewhat more 
flexible than wage and salaries alone, there is a significant amount of rigidity for 
compensation. Furthermore, firms do not seem to circumvent wage rigidity by 
changing other types of compensation. 
Few studies attempt to discriminate between the fairness- and the contract-
theories of DNWR, as the key implications are shared by both hypotheses. One 
possible way to circumvent this problem is to compare differences between coun-
tries. Based on the cross-country differences of ten EU countries, Dessy (2002) 
finds evidence that DNWR is more prevalent in countries with intermediate levels 
of bargaining than in countries with centralized or decentralized wage setting, 
while high bargaining coverage seems to reduce DNWR. Holden and Wulfsberg 
(2004) use industry panel data from Eurostat, covering 12 countries over the pe-
riod 1973-99, and find evidence that strict employment protection legislation and 
high union density increase DNWR, while the effect of bargaining coverage is 
positive but insignificant. These latter results support the contract theory of Hol-
den (2004). On the other hand, the fact that downward nominal rigidity is also 
found in countries with weak legal protection of workers' nominal wages, as in the 
US and Switzerland, suggests that fairness considerations are also of importance.  
Another way to discriminate between theories is to derive testable implications 
that differ. Elsby (2004) suggests a test based on the idea that the effect of infla-





plained in section 2 above, the risk of future DNWR will lead forward-looking 
firms to attenuate wage increases. Elsby argues that if DNWR is caused by fair-
ness concerns, the attenuation will be weaker under low inflation (as DNWR is 
less likely to be binding in the future), but inflation will not affect attenuation 
caused by contract effects. Elsby finds evidence for the UK that attenuation of 
wage increases is stronger under low inflation, supporting the fairness hypothesis. 
Holden (2002) also suggests a test for discriminating between these two theories, 
but this test has not yet been implemented.  
While most studies use recent data, there is also evidence for the existence of 
DNWR in earlier time periods. Among others, Hines (2000) shows that nominal 
wages were rigid in the downturns in the US in 1893, 1929 and 1981. Fregert 
(2000) provides evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity in Sweden during 




Evidence of a long-run inflation - unemployment – trade-off 
 
According to the standard view, there is no long-run trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment. Yet there are now a number of studies that report evidence in 
support of such a trade-off. Some illustrative examples are these: Bullard and 
Keating (1995) studying the long-run relationship between inflation and output in 
58 countries over the period 1960-90. They find a positive and significant long-
run response of the level of real output to a permanent inflation shock for the four 
European countries with the lowest rates of inflation. Karanassou et al. (2003a) 
find a long-run Phillips curve trade-off for a panel of EU countries for the period 
1977 – 1998. Akerlof et al. (1996) and Karanassou et al. (2003b) find a long-run 
Phillips curve trade-off in the US. Ahmed and Rogers (2000) also find that the 
long-run effects of inflation on output in the US are positive. Lundborg and Sack-
lén (2001) finds evidence of a long-run Phillips curve trade-off in Sweden for the 
period 1963-2000, indicating that a reduction in inflation from 2 ½ per cent to zero 
is associated with an increase in unemployment of more than two percentage 
points. Correspondingly, Fortin and Dumont (2000) find evidence on Canadian 
aggregate data suggesting that an increase in inflation from 1 ½ percent to 2 ½ 
percent would reduce unemployment by 1 ½ percentage points.  
These findings are consistent with other studies reporting persistent negative 
output effects of too strict monetary policy. Ball (1999) presents evidence support-
ing the view that a too strict monetary policy in the 1980s and 1990s in some 
European countries has led to a long-lasting increase in unemployment. Bernanke 
and Carey (1996) document that countries that stuck longer to the Gold standard in 
the 1930s, involving years with falling prices, experienced higher real wages and 




So far it would, nevertheless, be fair to say that the evidence of a long-run infla-
tion – unemployment trade-off is disputed. Among other things, several of the 
studies are based on rather restrictive assumptions; see, for example, the discus-
sion of Akerlof et al. (1996) by Gordon (1996) and Mankiw (1996), as well as 
Canmba-Mendez, Carcia and Palenzuela (2003). 
8  Will society adapt? 
Many economist are sceptical towards the idea that low inflation will entail impor-
tant and persistent effects on output and employment, based on the argument that 
any downward rigidity that may exist is the result of an inflationary environment, 
and that society will adapt to a zero inflation policy without a large and persistent 
impact on output and employment (see, for example, Gordon, 1996, Hogan, 1997, 
Yates, 1998). Such changes may affect the institutional setting, e.g. the type of la-
bour contracts, or people’s view of what is fair behaviour. 
It seems reasonable to expect that the costs associated with higher unemploy-
ment under very low inflation will induce changes in the way labour markets op-
erate. One would expect pay systems to become more flexible, for example by a 
more extensive use of bonus systems, although the evidence in Lebow et al (2003) 
referred to above may indicate that this will have limited effect. 
Holden (2001) explores a model where firms choose between fixed wage con-
tracts (where the employer cannot lay off the worker, and the wage can only be 
changed by mutual consent), or contracts where employment is at will, so that ei-
ther party may terminate employment. It is shown that a fixed wage contract pro-
vides better incentives for investment and training, while employment at will fa-
cilitates efficient mobility. High inflation makes fixed wage contracts more 
attractive as seen from the firm, because it erodes the real value of a fixed contract 
wage over time, so that badly matched workers are more likely to quit for other 
jobs. Thus, disinflation has opposing effects on labour market rigidity: fixed wage 
contracts become more rigid in real terms, but fewer firms will choose fixed wage 
contracts.  
An alternative interpretation of Holden’s (2001) model is that fixed wage con-
tracts correspond to jobs in countries with strong employment protection legisla-
tion, where labour market laws and regulations constitute important barriers to 
firms’ possibility of unilaterally cutting nominal wages. Employment at will re-
sembles jobs in countries with weak employment legislation, like the UK and the 
US, or it can be thought of as temporary jobs. Under this interpretation, a reduc-
tion in the rate of inflation will exacerbate the real wage rigidity imposed by em-
ployment protection legislation. On the other hand, firms are likely to try to opt 
out of the rigidity by choosing more temporary labour contracts, consistent with 
evidence of increased use of temporary labour contracts in Sweden in the low-
inflation period in the 1990s  (Agell and Lundborg, 2003). In addition, the politi-
cal pressure towards a weakening of the employment protection legislation is 





Regarding the effect of fairness, Gordon (1996) argues that in a low-inflation 
economy, nominal wage cuts will become more common, and there will be less 
reason to view them as unfair. Against this view one can argue that the fairness 
and legal explanations for DNWR may be complementary, and that they may 
strengthen each other in the sense that the existence of both makes either more 
persistent: The fact that many labour market participants find nominal wage cuts 
unfair may also contribute to the continued existence of the legal protection of 
nominal wages. The legal protection of nominal wages makes wage cuts rare even 
in a low-inflation environment, thus preventing Gordon’s (1996) argument that the 
fairness considerations will be undermined by wage cuts being “too common”. 
Empirical evidence also indicates that one should not be too optimistic that la-
bour markets and wage-setting institutions will adapt rapidly to low inflation. The 
extensive downward nominal wage rigidity in Sweden and Switzerland docu-
mented by Agell and Lundborg (2003) and Fehr and Goette (2000), even after 
years of close to zero inflation and high unemployment, also shows that rigidities 
may be highly persistent. Fehr and Goette also find that the wage “sweep-up” 
caused by nominal rigidity is strongly correlated with unemployment, suggesting 
that downward rigidity of nominal wages does contribute to higher unemploy-
ment. 
9  Concluding remarks  
Let me briefly summarise the main conclusions, as seen from a policy-oriented 
perspective. Both the theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence indicate 
that wage pressure is increased under low inflation. To keep wage growth down, 
and to ensure consistency between the wage and price setting, higher unemploy-
ment is probably required if one aims at very low inflation. Over time, labour 
markets and wage setting institutions will probably adapt partially to low inflation, 
by increased use of flexible remuneration and temporary wage contracts. How-
ever, it is difficult to predict how far-reaching these changes will be.  
In macro and monetary economics, wage and price rigidities are often the key 
source of inefficiencies. However, as observed above, wage and price rigidities 
may also play useful roles, as sharing risk or protecting against opportunistic be-
haviour. In particular, the legal rule that contract renegotiations require mutual 
consent plays an important role in ensuring efficient investments. Thus, if lower 
inflation leads to wages being more flexible, this would involve costs as well as 
benefits. Furthermore, without restrictions on the employer’s right to unilaterally 
cut nominal wages, employment protection legislation is unlikely to be effective. 
Thus, proposals for changes in labour laws are likely to be met with strong resis-
tance from unions and insiders. Evidence also suggests that the notion that nomi-
nal wage cuts are unfair is persistent. Thus it seems likely that adaptation will not 
be complete, so that, even in the very long run, a very low inflation target will im-




From a policy point of view, a key question is clearly at which rate of inflation 
wage pressure increases to the extent that it involves non-negligible costs. Lund-
borg and Sacklén (2001) find evidence for Sweden that a reduction in long-run in-
flation from 2 ½ to zero per cent would be associated with an increase in unem-
ployment of more than two percentage points. In contrast, Nickell and Quintini 
(2003) find evidence for the UK that an increase in long-run inflation from 2 ½ to 
5 ½ per cent would cause equilibrium unemployment to fall by only 0.13 percent-
age points. However, there is obviously a lot of uncertainty involved with these 
estimates, and there is also likely be considerable variation across countries with 
different labour market institutions. One should also remember that if low infla-
tion is associated with high productivity growth, lower price margins or low im-
port price growth, there will be more room for nominal wage growth, and thus 
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